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Ted Edwards, General Manager of a supermarket banner called “Super AM,” was 
leaving his office on March 14, 2003 when the phone rang.   He picked up the 
receiver and heard Brian Davis, his superior and the President of EXPO AM say: 
 
Ted, I just met with Mr. Schuh.  In the meeting we reviewed Super AM’s 
performance.  As you know, your two stores have cost over $5 million in 
development costs and operating losses since the banner started.  Last year 
alone they lost nearly $3 million on operations in fiscal 2002.   
 
Mr. Schuh wants Super AM profitable within the six months.  He said, 
“Either Edwards fixes the problem or we will.” He wants a turnaround plan 
on his desk first thing Friday, March 21st.  That gives you a week.  Let’s 
discuss your draft plan at 8:00 AM on Tuesday morning.  We’ll go through it 
to make sure that it will satisfy Mr. Schuh.  I don’t need to tell you how 
important this is to your career. 
 
As a banner, Super AM had several stores operating under a common name and a 
common merchandising mix.   By the end of 2002 it consisted of two supermarkets 
in Rochester, Massachusetts.  Another store was to open in July 2003, followed by 
three more.  By the end of 2005 the banner’s sales were budgeted to be $39 million 
per year.   
 
The Rochester Market 
 
Rochester, a town of 182,000 people, was an hour’s drive from Boston, 
Massachusetts which had 600,000 people.  Six million people lived within an hour 
of Rochester.  Its population was growing at a rate of four percent per year while 
Boston’s population was declining due to out-migration. 
 
Rochester was divided culturally.  The east side had a large German and Dutch 
population which valued their traditional, conservative city atmosphere and 
patronized retailers providing traditional products at good prices. The west side 
had a more cosmopolitan population, the result of the university and the financial 
industry located there.  The disposable income on the east side of Rochester was 
ten percent lower and its residents spent 17 percent less on food prepared outside 
the home.  All customers in Rochester shared similar interests with other US food 




The competition in Rochester had evolved.  In 1990 Rochester was well served by 
two independent grocers, Alberts and Shop Smart.  Massachusetts’s largest 
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supermarket chains entered the Rochester market in the 1980s but all left after 
finding that their competitive offers were insufficient to attract business away from 
the independents. 
 
In the mid 1990s the independent chains were purchased by food chains: National 
purchased Alberts and Franklins purchased Shop Smart.  Both were large chains 
that incorporated the former independents in their organizations as separate 
divisions with their own management and merchandising.  Rivalry between the 
two chains resulted in one of the lowest-cost food baskets in the state and high 
levels of service.  Workers bagging groceries at checkouts were common in 
Rochester but rare elsewhere in the state.  Also, shoppers in Rochester spent 15-20 
percent less time in waiting checkout lines than in Boston.  Shoppers in Rochester 
had very few complaints about their choice of supermarkets.   
 
Of the 20 supermarkets in Rochester in 2002 (See Exhibit 1 for store locations), 
Alberts had twelve stores.  Seven were large conventional stores (55,000 square 
feet) and five were smaller stores (25,000 square feet).  All had high sales volumes 
relative to their size. Their unionized workers received pay slightly below average 
for the state and there were few union work rules.  All stores were well-located and 
provided good customer service throughout.  Shoppers occasionally complained 
about cleanliness, lighting, and shortages of advertised products.  Alberts' long-
term strategy was to develop much larger stores (95,000 square feet) that could 
provide shoppers with one stop shopping for food, nonfoods and services.  Less 
successful stores would be closed as the larger stores opened.   
 
EXPO-AM had opened a Super Center on Liberty Road in 1998.  It was the largest 
store in the market at 155,000 square feet and carried an extensive selection of 
food and non-food products.  This banner was owned by National but operated 
independently from Alberts.  National opened it to dissuade Wal-Mart from 
entering the market.  Although Super Center stores were successful elsewhere in 
the United States, this store had little success in Rochester.  National closed it in 
2000 and reopened it in 2001 as a large Alberts supermarket selling food and drugs 
(Store A1 in Exhibit 1) and a Discounter’s store selling non-food products.  
 
Shop Smart’s seven food stores varied considerably in size and sales volume.  They 
were staffed by non-unionized workers.  Shoppers appreciated the friendly, helpful 
customer service reflected in part by the many baggers at the checkouts.  Shop 
Smart maintained its profitability in recent years by minimizing new investment 
and devoting 35 percent of its selling floor space to non-food items.  Its stores 
needed large capital expenditures to make then as attractive as Alberts but it was 
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Exhibit 1: A Map of Supermarket Locations in Rochester, 2002 
 
 
Where:   A is an Alberts supermarket 
  SS is a Shop Smart supermarket 





EXPO-AM was the U.S. operating division of EXPO-EU, a European supermarket 
chain which had 686 supermarkets operating under various banners across Europe 
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including ASBN, EXPO, Gluveld Markts, and Super EU.  In 2000 EXPO-AM had 
sales of $3.5 billion which produced before-tax-profits of $66 million.  The company 
was headquartered in Boston and had 197 stores.  EXPO-AM’s workers had been 
unionized 50 years earlier.  They received full union rates and management 
considered the work rules restrictive.  In a typical EXPO-AM store full time 




Before 1995 EXPO-AM focused on opening new food stores in suburban areas.  It 
was never the price or service leader.  Instead it offered weekly specials at low 
prices in neat, clean stores.  It maintained its profitability through excellent 
merchandising and strict control of costs. 
 
By 1995 urban growth was slower and customers were more selective.  
Management recognized that different merchandising, pricing and identities were 
needed to appeal to different market segments.  To offer this management started 
acquiring regional chains with good locations and strong consumer franchises.  The 
chain’s name was maintained but store operations were consolidated under one 
management and all merchandising was centralized at head office so that costs 
were kept low.   
 
By 2002 the share of total supermarket sales in the state held by food chains had 
declined by 0.2 percent each year for the previous five years.  Each one percent 
drop in market share represented a loss of $200 million in sales.  Independently-
owned supermarkets were successfully challenging many of chains because they 
operated with low cost, non-unionized labor.  They provided superior customer 
service, competitive pricing and a pleasant store environment.   
 
EXPO-AM had the highest share of supermarket sales in Massachusetts in 2002 at 
64 percent.  Management had been able to mask the continuing decline in sales of 
1.5 percent per year in its original stores through acquisitions but top management 




The management team at EXPO-AM was lead by Hans Schuh, 48.  He became the 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer at the end of 2002.  For five years before 
that he had been Senior Vice President of Operations with Mammoth Food 
Markets, a very successful food retailer in the southeastern US.  On his 
appointment, EXPO’s headquarters in Europe gave him a dual mandate.  First he 
had to ensure the smooth and effective integration of the recently acquired Cubbies 
Food Mart operations into EXPO-AM operations.  Second, he had to correct the 
erosion of sales and profits at the existing EXPO-AM stores.  Schuh was assisted  Harling / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 11, Issue 4, 2008 
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Exhibit 2: Organizational Structure of EXPO-AM, 2001 
Source: Company record 
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by Brian Davis, 45, who became President of EXPO-AM in mid 2001.  He replaced 
Ingo Perez who was recognized throughout the organization as a talented 




The organizational structure of EXPO-AM had three main parts: administrative 
management, merchandizing management and operations management (Exhibit 
2).  Administrative management looked after the strategy of the business, 
including the retail formats (banners) used and the markets served.  It also looked 
after the management of human resources and finance of the business. 
 
Merchandising management was responsible for buying the merchandise sold in 
the stores, controlling its space allocation in the stores, and setting the pricing and 
promotion of it.  It also advised stores how to retail products effectively.  
Merchandising was centralized at headquarters in Boston.  It was a profit center 
which made money by buying groceries and transferring these at cost-plus to store 
operations.  Merchandising bolstered its total profit by purchasing large volumes so 
it got greater discounts.  It furthered enhanced its profit by collecting allowances 
from food product manufacturers for a variety of reasons.   
 
Operations management was responsible for handling products, including 
warehousing and distribution of products and all activities in the stores.  Regional 
managers had individual store managers and maintenance services reporting to 
them.  Individual store managers, called directors, were responsible for the 
profitability of the stores they managed.  The profitability of stores was strongly 
influenced by the competitive situation each faced.  The largest cost the directors 
controlled was labor which accounted for 65 percent of variable cost of a store.    
 
Developing Super AM 
 
In 1999 top management of EXPO-AM was looking for a new merchandising 
approach that would allow its traditional stores to become more profitable.  
Following the suggestion of top management in EXPO-EU, it looked at a recently 
proven model used in England—Super EU.   
 
The European Model 
 
The Super EU banner was developed by a division operating 65 supermarkets, a 
warehouse, and a central office in London.  The division closed in 1996 after losing 
money for many years.  Its management then worked out a new store layout and 
negotiated a unique labor/management agreement with its unionized labor.  Under 
the new agreement which was known as the Gain Sharing Program (GSP), 
unionized employees were called "associates" and given a voice in how the stores 
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were run.  Their wages were 15 percent lower than before but they received an 
additional incentive bonus based on the relationship between the total wages of the 
store and the store’s sales revenue.  With successful execution, associates could 
earn slightly more than they had previously.  
 
In 1997, the division restarted operations under the Super EU banner.  Starting 
with 23 stores, by year end it was operating 35 stores.  By 2001 it was EXPO’s most 
profitable divisions and had 140 stores across England.  EXPO’s Annual Report 
stated: “The Gain Sharing Program in an entrepreneurial environment translates 
into high morale, outstanding customer service, and an atmosphere of 
neighborliness.”  All Super EU stores qualified for bonuses and 28 percent 
exceeded expected savings between 1997 and 2001, providing employees with above 
standard bonuses.   
 
The American Version 
 
Ingo Perez gave Dave Philips, Executive Vice President of Merchandising at 
EXPO-AM, responsibility for testing whether the Super EU model would make 
sense in the U.S.  The model was attractive because it could reduce store labor 
costs significantly.  Management estimated that the Super EU approach in 
Massachusetts would save it over $500,000 per year in direct labor costs and fringe 
benefits for the average EXPO-AM store (Exhibit 3).  Moreover, a new store banner  
 
Exhibit 3: Comparison of Head and Wages Costs: Using Different Approaches 
to Labor, 2000 
  EXPO-AM Super-AM 
Weekly Store Sales   $258,000.00   $258,000.00 
    
Wage Cost Calculation     
 





Total store hours  2,150  2,150 
EXPO-AM Full Time Hours (28 X 37)  1,036   
Super-AM Full Time Hours (10 X 37)    370 
Part Time Hours (Total less Full Time 
Hours) 
1,114  1,780 
 
Hourly Labor Costs Including Fringes 
  
EXPO-AM Full Time $18.40/hour   $19,062.  
EXPO-AM Part Time $10.25/hour   $11,419.  
Super AM Full Time $14.70/hour     $5,439. 
Super AM Part Time $7.75/hour     $13,795. 
Total Weekly Wage Cost   $30,481.   $19,234. 
    
Annual Savings in Using Super-AM 
Approach to Wages 
   $584,839. 
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would give EXPO-AM greater ability to match the local competition.  Management 
decided to adopt the Super EU approach under the banner name “Super AM Food 
Markets.”  It anticipated that five or six stores would be needed for the banner to 
break even. 
 
Exhibit 4:  Calculating the Incentive under the Gain Sharing Plan 
 
Definitions: 
Total Wages     = Hourly Rate  +  Fringe Rate for All Employees 
Total Productive Wages  = Total Wages  -  Management Wages 
Labor Rate  = Total Productive Wages  /  Total Store Sales 
 
The bonus pool is calculated on the basis of a sliding scale as illustrated below: 
  
  

































































1.) Store 1 finishes the year with: 
  Sales     = $13,416,000 
  Wages   = $1,000,168 
  Labor Rate   = 7.45 percent 
  Bonus Pool  = $13,416,000* 2.3 percent = $308,568. 
 
2.) A Full Time employee's wages at Store 1 are: 
$34,000/yr or 3.40 percent of the store's Total Wages 
 
3.) Employee's bonus is: 
$308,568* 0.0340 = $10,491 
 
 
The first and necessary step for the model to work was to get a new labor 
agreement with EXPO-AM’s unionized work force.   Philips, working with EXPO-
AM’s Industrial Relations department, negotiated an agreement with the Food 
Workers’ Union.  The new agreement was signed in June 0f 2000.  The conditions 
were as follow: 
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1.  Full Time store employees would become “associates” because they would 
contribute ideas on the management of stores. 
2.  For each $25,000 in weekly sales, the Super AM store was required to have 
one full time associate—in EXPO-AM stores one was required for every 
$10,000 in weekly sales. 
3.  Each Super AM store would have its own seniority system, eliminating 
transfer of associates from other EXPO-AM banners except for promotional 
reasons. 
4.  Super AM pay rates for associates would be 20 percent under those 
scheduled in EXPO-AM’s labor agreements.  
5.  A GSP process would be in place in each Super AM store. 
6.  All associates in each Super AM store would share in an annual bonus.  The 
size of the bonus pool would be based on a store’s total annual labor cost 
relative to sales revenue. (Exhibit 4 presents more detail). 
 
The new approach reduced each store’s labor complement to 10 full time 
employees.  EXPO-AM had never operated a store with so few full time employees 
but this was the only way to decrease full time hours to 25 percent of total hours.   
 
Under the GSP process associates were encouraged to contribute ideas for better 
managing the business.  These ideas and issues were discussed and acted upon at 
the lowest possible organizational level.  Matters only went higher when solutions 
affected or required agreement from those outside the group involved.  The forum 
for discussing ideas and issues was a series of meetings was held on a regular basis 
(Exhibit 5).  The first and lowest level meeting was at the departmental level in the 
store.  The second level was at the store level.  The third level of meeting was at 
the regional level and results were to be known at the store level within two weeks 
of this meeting.  The fourth meeting was at the head office of EXPO-AM. 
 
Super AM's Fit in Rochester 
 
EXPO-AM’s management chose to first use the Super AM model in Rochester for 
several reasons.  First, it had no stores in Rochester—its closest EXPO-AM stores 
were in Ridgemount (7 miles away), Plymouth (15 miles away), and Peru (24 miles 
away).  Second, management reasoned if this approach could compete in this 
highly competitive market, it would work in any market.  Third, Rochester was less 
well served than other markets with one supermarket per 10,0050 residents while 
Boston had one per 8,970 residents and Worcester had one per 7,810 residents.  
Management calculated the Rochester had the potential for at least four additional 
supermarkets based on the number of stores per capita and projected population 
growth.   
 
EXPO-AM’s management reasoned that Super AM would have a tactical pricing 
advantage over established competitors in Rochester.  Competitors with more Harling / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 11, Issue 4, 2008 
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  REGIONAL  BOARD  MEETINGS
  Chair: General Manager
  Attendees: Exec.V.P. Merchandising
V.P. Human Resources
General Manager - Super-AM
All Store Directors
One rep. from each store.
 Frequency:  Every 2 Months.
  Duration: Usually less than 4 hours.
  STORE  BOARD  MEETINGS
  Chair: Store Director
  Attendees: Store Director
All Department Managers.
One rep. from each Dept.
  Frequency: Monthly
  Duration: Usually less than 2 hours.
GROCERY SERVICE PRODUCE FRESH MEAT DELI BAKERY   DEPARTMENT  BOARD  MEETINGS
DEPT. DEPT. DEPT. DEPT. DEPT DEPT   Chair:  Department manager.
MEETING MEETING MEETING MEETING MEETING MEETING   Attendees:  All Department associates.
  Frequency: Monthly





Exhibit 5: The GSP Meeting Structure Harling / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 11, Issue 4, 2008 
 
stores would find it expensive to match its low prices and many price promotions 
because they sold much greater volumes.   
 
Sizing up the Market 
 
Philips had Edwards, then an employee in Merchandising, survey shoppers and 
examine competitors’ stores in Rochester.  His surveys showed that shoppers 
wanted more variety in goods, especially perishable products such as bakery goods 
and fresh fish, and better quality groceries.  Shoppers saw Alberts as Rochester’s 
quality leader and Shop Smart as its price leader.  Edwards’ surveys of store prices 
showed that Alberts was the lowest priced but that Shop Smart had a far more 
intense and visual in-store promotion using in-store price specials.  These specials 
represented additional savings for regular customers but they were not large 
enough to be advertised in newspapers.  Shoppers at each chain expressed 
tremendous consumer loyalty. 
 
EXPO-AM needed sites for stores but established competitors already had the best 
sites.  So it worked with a land developer which provided sites under ten year 
leases.  The site for Store 1 (SAM 1 in Exhibit 1) was created by assembling land in 
a developed part of town.  This made it an expensive site.  The site for Store 2 was 
on the east side of town in an “immature” market but management concluded that 
new home construction would soon produce the population needed to support a 
store.  It would face competition from a mid-sized Alberts' store approximately 1.5 
miles closer to the center of town.  The site for Store 3 on Liberty road on the west 
side of Rochester where population density was sufficient to support a store and 
more housing was being constructed nearby.  The challenge with the site was that 
it was on a major road which made it expensive.  Also, Alberts’ two most successful 
stores in Rochester were also located along this road.  Site development still had to 
find sites for two additional stores. 
 
Developing the Merchandising Format 
 
Edwards picked up a recent article from his desk and scanned through a quote he 
had highlighted in it.  Gary Primus, president of the Boston-based Distribution 
Northeast Inc., a buying group for 3,000 independent food retailers across New 
England, was quoted as saying   
 
The Rochester area is a very select market, different from anywhere else in 
the country.  Anybody that's not local has a very difficult time... If you're a 
little better than the next guy, if you give your people a reason to shop at 
your place more often, you're going to make some money.  But anybody who 
tells you there's big money to be made in the region is just whistling Dixie. 
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Exhibit 6:  Comparison of Competitive Conditions in Rochester, July 2000* 




Comments regarding Super AM’s strategy 
Consumer Base Advantages         
Advertising ++  +  ++  Same  allotment to newspapers as Alberts 
Customer Service  +  ++  ++  Friendly and fast 
Every-day pricing  +  ++  ++  In store specials and matching Albert’s pricing 
Environment  +  -  ++  Attractive since the newest store 
Hours of operation  -  -  +  Only store open 24 hours a day  
Location  ++  ++  -  Only one store 
Quality of perishables  +  +  ++  Generous reduction and refund policy 
Variety  ++  +  ++  Many ethnic and few private label products 
Weekly features  +  -  ++  Lots of specials, signifying “More for less” 




       
Advertising cost  ++  +  -  No synergistic advantages since only one store 
Department margins  ++  ++  -  Need better sales mix and more experience 
Occupancy costs  +  ++  -  High rent 
Wage costs         
 Wage  rate  -  +  ++  Contractual  advantages 
  Productivity  ++  +  -  New store = New help = SLOW 
Total Operational 
Advantages 
7 7 2   
 
Overall Advantages  18  16  17  Difficult opening position 
* Where + indicates a favorable situation, and ++ a very favorable situation. 
Source: Prepared by Ted Edwards   
 
 
Edwards designed a marketing mix for Super AM that looked attractive when 
compared with competitors (Exhibit 6).  The store’s layout was based on a store of 
65,000 square feet (Exhibit 7).  The layout would project an image of freshness and 
variety.  Its produce counters would be the largest in the EXPO-AM chain, 
occupying over 15,000 square feet of the sales floor.  The meat department of 4,500 
square feet and the deli of 2,000 square feet would carry unique ethnic products.  A 
complete in-store bakery department would occupy another 2,000 square feet and 
offer fresh baked goods daily.   The dry grocery department, with 27,500 square 
feet, would include over 300 ethnic items not found in EXPO-AM stores.  And the 
dairy department of 2,000 square feet would sell cheese from a local cheese factory 
in addition to regular brands.   The rest of the square footage would be devoted to 
floral, frozen foods, health and beauty aids, pharmacy and service.  
      
The pricing strategy was complex.  Super AM tried to maintain comparable prices 
on produce and meat.  To avoid price competition with Alberts, Super AM matched 
competitors’ advertised special prices on basic grocery staples, bread, butter, 
cigarettes, eggs, milk, sugar, and tobacco.  It maintained comparable prices on 
other items by checking competitors’ prices a minimum of twice weekly.   
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To attract shoppers’ attention, weekly advertised specials were priced below the 
advertised special prices of competitors.  Promotions were printed in the local 
Rochester newspaper.  This allowed Super AM to create its advertising two weeks 
before the printing date, and alter its copy up to 24 hours before the newspaper was 
printed.  This allowed Super AM to keep its price promotions for meat and produce 
in line with cost fluctuations and to match competitors' advertising.  In addition 
each store had a constant selection of at least 300 in-store (non-advertised) specials.  
These were well signed, creating the impression of extra value for shoppers.   
 
Super AM also offered more service.  There were more baggers at check out 
counters who were trained to be friendly, courteous and helpful.  This included 
showing the customers where a product was, and handling refunds quickly and 
courteously.  “Competitors might increase their workers at the checkouts but 
copying the workers’ attitude will be difficult,” said Edwards.  The store 
demonstrated further its interest in customers by providing free coffee at the 
courtesy desk and a suggestion box near the checkouts.  
 
For the shoppers’ convenience, the store was open 24 hours a day six days a week 
instead of the 90 hours a week of the competitors. 
 
Building the Organizational Infrastructure 
 
The Super AM format required changes in EXPO-AM’s approach to both 
merchandising and store management.  Super AM was given two merchandisers of 
its own to buy specialty and local products offered in its stores. These were shipped 
directly from suppliers to Super AM stores.  Super AM’s merchandisers could also 
draw product from EXPO-AM’s merchandising operations, capturing the low cost 
due to high volume purchases.  Super AM’s merchandisers alone decided pricing 
and advertised weekly promotions.  They were also given the authority to hire and 
fire store associates—in EXPO-AM this was the responsibility of the store manager.  
This meant that the store’s department managers and associates were very 
attentive to what the merchandisers said. 
 
Super-AM’s store management was kept separate from that of other stores because 
the union agreement and the GSP process required a very different approach to 
management.  As part of this approach, only Super AM’s employees were allowed in 
its stores.   
 
Staffing Super AM 
 
Philips was so pleased with Edwards work that he strongly encouraged Perez to 
appoint Edwards as general manager of Super AM.  Although Edwards was only 32 
year old, he had a wealth of experience at EXPO-AM, having worked for the 
company since he was 16.  He had moved into store management upon graduation 
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from university.  Within three years he was managing one of its busiest stores in 
Ridgemount.  Edwards was then promoted to the head office in Boston where he ran 
the productivity department which managed store labor usage and performed time 
and motion studies.  Edwards then spent two years in the merchandising 
department assembling weekly newspaper advertisements and flyers for EXPO-AM.  
A manager in EXPO-AM’s headquarters commented, “Moving up this organization 
is very slow and it you make one mistake, you are gone.  Edwards is one of the few 
successful fast trackers.” 
 
Perez made Edwards manager of Super AM in 2000.  Edwards decided that three 
individuals could handle the merchandising responsibilities.  He took charge of dry 
groceries, dairy and frozen food and all store promotions and weekly 
advertisements.  The two other merchandisers were experienced merchandisers 
from EXPO-AM.  He put one in charge of specialty products for the meat, deli, and 
bakery departments and the other in charge of special items for the produce and 
floral departments.   
 
Edwards then developed the processes required to open and operate new stores.  He 
tested the processes when he opened the first store, of which he became its director.  
He then he hired directors for each new stores as needed and worked with them to 
staff their stores. 
 
Staffing the stores posed a challenge for several reasons.  First employees had to 
manage more part time employees than was typical at EXPO-AM.  And second, 
employees were developing the new store format, all the while serving demanding 
shoppers and competing against aggressive competitors.  Edwards personally 
recruited 10 full-time associates for the first store: 2 assistant store directors, 5 
department managers, and 3 others.  Edwards commented on his approach: 
 
With so few employees in the store, I had to get the best I could find.   
I was able to attract a core group from the store I had managed in 
Ridgemount.  They were young, aggressive types who had not been infected 
with EXPO-AM’s culture.  Being young, they lacked the seniority needed for 
promotion in EXPO-AM.  I was able to offer them department manager 
positions in which they had the potential to make more money than at 
present.  But I also had to appeal to their egos to get them, telling them that 
I needed them to make it a success.  My track record in the company gave me 
credibility.  Many who joined me at Super AM were personal friends. 
 
The Part time staff were recruited through job placement advertisements in 
state employment offices.  Over 800 people responded and were interviewed 
200 for part time jobs in the first store.  We tested all of those selected for 
team and personality skills and checked their credentials carefully.  
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All employees were trained for Super AM.  Full time associates were given 30-40 
hours in customer service and 20 hours of training in the concept of GSP.  This 
compared with total training of 15-20 hours a new hire would receive in an EXPO-
AM store. Part time workers were given 37 hours of training.  This included 
training in the GSP procedures, how to handle fresh and value-added products, and 
customer service techniques.   
 
The General Manager of EXPO-AM’s Region 2 which included Ridgemount 
commented “I am sick of seeing Edwards around here.  First I’m excluded from 
participating in the development the Super AM stores, then he recruits my best 
workers.  I have pointed out to top management that they are making a big mistake 
but most are not listening.” 
 
Events in 2000 
 
The first Super AM store opened on Constitution Road in the center of Rochester at 
the end of November, 2000.  Its total sales in the first week surpassed the sales of 
the grand opening of any prior EXPO-AM store.   
 
Events in 2001 
 
Sales were nearly $15 million and, though Super AM’s first store had an operating 
loss of $670,000, an incentive bonus pool of over $60,000 was paid out to an 
enthusiastic group of associates at a banquet paid for by EXPO AM’s headquarters.  
 
Labor issues dogged the store over the year.  First, twenty percent of Super AM’s 
operating loss was attributed to inexperience employees.  This problem was 
considered “solved” by year-end.  A more serious problem was a result of the limited 
number of full time workers.  It meant that the store was short of management 
when anyone was ill or went on vacation.  And when employees were in the store, 
they were so busy training new part-time workers that they did not have enough 
time to perform ongoing maintenance.  The time spent training part timers was 
especially onerous because of the high turnover of staff—on average part-timer 
workers only stayed for eight months.  Exit interviews indicated that they were 
leaving because their starting wages were low.  This problem could not be resolved 
by raising wages through merit increases because of restrictions in the labor 
agreement.  Ironically, the first store had more employees than planned during the 
first year because some were being trained for the second store. 
 
The GSP process worked well within the store, but personnel at the regional level 
had trouble adjusting to questions and suggestions from people at the store.  For 
example, shoppers at Store 1 were often greeted with the smell of rotten fish.  This 
happened because the prevailing winds blew the exhaust from fans in the seafood 
department across the roof of the building to the store entrance where the odor was 
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sucked back into the store by the fans.   The regional people responsible for 
buildings made the necessary physical adjustment to solve the problem only after 
three months of shoppers’ complaints and associates’ suggestions.    
 
Other employees in the EXPO-AM started telling stories suggesting that Super AM 
was a “problem child.”  Once while in head office, Edwards overheard one vice 
president say to another executive “Super AM’s departmental margins are so low, 
some weeks they could save money by just giving merchandise away.” 
 
Each of the major competitors responded in its own way to the entry of Super AM.  
Shop Smart reacted immediately by matching every one of Super AM's advertised 
prices—a very costly tactic for it.  Alberts did not react until April, when it re-
opened the Super Center on Liberty Avenue as an Alberts Food and Drug 
combination store.  Management at Alberts had been critical of the Super Center, 
its sister chain, for invading its hometown and now had a political and financial 
need to make the newly renovated site successful.  It increased advertising, offered 
additional specials, and lowered prices.  This brought back many previously 
disappointed customers, putting pressure on store margins at Super AM.  Edwards 
lowered prices to maintain sales.  Surveys conducted by Super AM indicated that it 
was having trouble attracting customers from Alberts, but good success attracting 
them from Shop Smart.   
 
Edwards expressed disappointment when Perez left EXPO-AM to take a more 
senior position at Franklins.  Perez was replaced by Davis, a more conservative 
executive from the senior ranks of EXPO-AM. 
 
Events in 2002 
 
During 2002, Store 1 came under greater competitive pressure.  Edwards knew 
from new requests for store loyalty cards that Store 1 was still attracting a great 
number of new customers from Shop Smart.  Shop Smart’s management responded 
to lost shoppers by renovating its nearby store and introducing a sales program that 
attracted back the shoppers it had lost.   
 
In April Store 2 on the east side of Rochester was opened.  The area around Store 2 
had not developed as hoped because a local recession, which started the previous 
year, had stopped the construction of new homes.  This meant that Store 2 had to 
attract shoppers from the mid-sized Alberts' store (A10 in Exhibit 1) approximately 
0.5 miles away.  
 
Edwards bolstered Super AM’s overall sales by developing an extensive advertising 
campaign that blanketed Rochester with advertising.  The same grand-opening 
specials were available at both the first and second stores.  The opening sales of 
Store 2 were over $500,000 in the first week—only slightly less than sales of Store 
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1’s grand opening.  However sales at Store 2 quickly began to falter and, because of 
the heavy promotions, the two stores had combined losses of $250,000 for the first 
period following the grand opening.  For 2002 sales at Store 1 were 18 percent lower 
than the previous year and Super-AM had losses of $2.7 million.  No bonus 
incentive was paid to the associates at either store at the end of that year.   
 
Developing the Plan 
 
Davis called Edwards on March 14th to ask him to develop a turnaround plan given 
the poor performance of the banner (See Exhibit 8).  Davis said that there had been 
talk at headquarters of putting Super AM under an EXPO-AM supervisory team 
consisting of a District Manager and four EXPO-AM merchandisers.  Head office 
would take over control of advertising, pricing, and revert to EXPO-AM’s labor 
contract.  Super AM's two merchandisers would be re-assigned to other positions 
within the company.   
 
Exhibit 8: Consolidated performance of Super-AM, 2000-2003 
Actual 2000 Actual  2001 Actual 2002 Actual 2003 Aggregate to date
(1 period*) (13 periods-FY) (13 periods-FY) (Periods 1-2) (29 periods)
($000'S)    (%) ($000'S)    (%) ($000'S)    (%) ($000'S)    (%) ($000'S)    (%)
Store Sales  
   Grocery 1,631        65.6% 14,390      67.1% 20,585      68.0% 4,103        67.5% 40,709      67.5%
   Meat 388           15.6% 3,314        15.4% 4,636        15.3% 914           15.0% 9,252        15.3%
   Deli  100           4.0% 797           3.7% 1,042        3.4% 193           3.2% 2,133        3.5%
   Bakery 73             2.9% 561           2.6% 722           2.4% 126           2.1% 1,483        2.5%
   Produce 293          11.8% 2,397       11.2% 3,293       10.9% 740          12.2% 6,724       11.2%
Total Sales 2,485        100.0% 21,460      100.0% 30,279      100.0% 6,076        100.0% 60,300      100.0%
 
Store  Margins    
   Grocery 301           18.4% 2,251        15.6% 2,951        14.3% 524           12.8% 6,027        14.8%
   Meat 48             12.2% 522           15.7% 574           12.4% 139           15.2% 1,282        13.9%
   Deli  40             40.1% 290           36.3% 322           30.9% 58             30.1% 710           33.3%
   Bakery 29             39.8% 204           36.4% 267           37.0% 45             35.7% 545           36.8%
   Produce 79            27.0% 633          26.4% 728          22.1% 154          20.8% 1,594       23.7%
Total Store Margins 497           20.0% 3,900        18.2% 4,842        16.0% 920           15.1% 10,159      16.8%
LESS Adjustments 160           6.4% 1,490        6.9% 1,940        6.4% 188          3.1% 3,778       6.3%
Net Total Store Margins 337           13.6% 2,410        11.2% 2,902        9.6% 732           12.0% 6,381        10.6%
Total Store Income** 760           30.6% 4,326        20.2% 6,009        19.8% 1,319        21.7% 12,415      20.6%
     
Total Labor 255           10.3% 2,134        9.9% 3,427        11.3% 695           11.4% 6,510        10.8%
Total Advertising 152           6.1% 605           2.8% 698           2.3% 159           2.6% 1,614        2.7%
Total Supplies 25            1.0% 239          1.1% 296          1.0% 58            1.0% 618          1.0%
Total Variable Expense 432           17.4% 2,978        13.9% 4,421        14.6% 912           15.0% 8,742        14.5%
     -                
Selling Profit 329           13.2% 1,349        6.3% 1,588        5.2% 422           6.9% 3,687        6.1%
     
Operating Expense 194           7.8% 392           1.8% 722           2.4% 153           2.5% 1,460        2.4%
Occupancy Expense 88             3.5% 1,573        7.3% 2,972        9.8% 614           10.1% 5,247        8.7%
Opening Expense 743          29.9% 54            0.3% 599          2.0% 31            0.5% 1,427       2.4%
Total Fixed Expenses 1,025        2,019        4,292        798           8,134       
     
Store Contribution*** (696)         -28.0% (670)         -3.1% (2,704)      -8.9% (376)         -6.2% (4,447)      -7.4%
* 1 period = 4 weeks
** Total Store Income = Total Sales - Cost of Merchandise - Total Store Margins
*** Store Contribution is not final profit.  Divisional and Group Administration must still be subtracted as well as taxes.
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Edwards knew that standard EXPO-AM merchandising practices would eliminate 
the specialty products and local products brought in to cater to the local population.  
Store prices would also be increased to raise margins to match those of EXPO-AM’s 
stores.  Operations in the store would also change.  Personnel bagging customers’ 
orders would be eliminated because time studies showed that two cashiers were 
more productive because a “bagger” only speeded up the checkout by 50 percent.  
Wage costs would be reduced by eliminating some departments and collapsing 
others so that employees worked several different departments.  Employee hours 
would be reduced.  This would mean cutting back the hours of specialized employees 
like meat cutters. GSP meetings would be minimized or ignored.  Store hours would 
be reduced from 24 hours a day to the EXPO-AM’s standard of 8 AM to 10 PM.  
Edwards summarized the impact of such changes in a chart like the one he had 
created when planning Super AM’s offer (See Exhibit 9). 
 
Edwards said to his wife, "I feel terrible about what will happen.  Management has 
little appreciation for gain sharing—none of them have been trained in GSP.  
Associates bring forward good suggestions but I know they aren't going to be  
 
Exhibit 9: Comparison of Competitive Conditions in Rochester, March 2003* 




Comments regarding Super AM’s strategy 
Consumer Base Advantages         
Advertising  ++  +  -  Ad space cut back 
Customer Service  +  +  -  Insufficient hours allotted by headquarters 
Every-day pricing  ++  +  -  Limited in store specials and no matching 
Albert’s pricing 
Environment  +  -  +  Have the newest store, but Alberts has been 
upgrading 
Hours of operation  -  -  -  Standard hours of operation  
Location  ++  ++  +  Has three stores 
Quality of perishables  ++  +  -  Tight reduction and refund policy 
Variety  ++  +  +  Few ethnic and many EXPO AM private label 
products 
Weekly features  +  -  +  Fewer specials with smaller reductions  
Total  Consumer  Advantages  13 7 4  
 
Operational Based Advantages         
Advertising cost  ++  +  -  Fewer sales = fewer ads = fewer sales and so on 
Department margins  ++  +  -  Low sales producing low margins 
Occupancy costs  +  ++  -  Highest rent 
Wage  costs       
  Wage rate  -  -  +  Wage rates maturing 
 Productivity  ++  +  -  Low  sales  Æ low productivity 
Total Operational Advantages  7  5  1   
 
Overall Advantages  20  12  5  Alberts dominates 
* Where + indicates a favorable situation, and ++ a very favorable situation. 
Source: Prepared by Ted Edwards   
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accepted, or even considered by management. Morale will fall. And I will have let 
down many of the people I recruited for the business."   
 
Under an advisory team, Edwards' duties would become typical of a regular store 
manager.  He would have little voice in the operations of the stores as EXPO-AM’s 
policies being implemented and enforced from head office.  Furthermore, head office 
only wanted the information it requested.   
 
As he worked on developing a turnaround plan, Edwards considered the present 
situation.  In April 2003, Store 3 on the west side of Rochester was scheduled to 
open.  Competition had changed since the first store opened.  Alberts had become a  
company “running on all eight cylinders.”  It was making no mistakes overall and 
had improved the quality of its perishables and in store specials.  Shop Smart had 
lost strength in the areas which had traditionally made it more attractive to 
customers.  Similar to Super AM at this point in customer attractiveness, it still 
had considerable operational advantages over Super AM.   
 
Edwards also realized that EXPO-AM’s options were constrained.  Each site that 
Super-AM occupied was under a 10 year leases.   And in July 2003 the labor 
contract that Super AM operated under would ended.  The union was saying it saw 
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